

Analyzing Lebanon's National Evaluation Ecosystem 2025



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Foreword

Lebanon does not lack ideas or effort. It lacks a system that gathers evidence, tests what works, and uses results to steer public action. This report addresses that gap. It offers a comprehensive, practitioner-grade mapping of the national evaluation ecosystem and sets out what is required to make evaluation a routine function of the state, embedded in law, carried by institutions, sustained by data, and rewarded in public careers. The timing is appropriate. Public demand for transparency is rising, reform windows are reopening, and partners are ready to align around measurable outcomes. This document provides both the architecture and the pathway.

This work reflects a shared commitment by the Observatory on Public Service and Good Governance at Saint Joseph University of Beirut and UNICEF Lebanon. Since 2015, in line with USJ's mission of public service and nation building, the Observatory has served as a national platform for administrative reform, integrity systems, and evidence informed decision making, guided by values of social justice, human dignity, ethics, discernment, freedom, democracy, civic participation, service to the common good, and academic excellence. UNICEF brings global standards for independent evaluation and a disciplined use of evidence to strengthen institutions and improve lives. In line with United Nations General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/69/237 and A/RES/77/283, we launched EvalMap25 to move Lebanon from ad hoc monitoring toward a nationally owned evaluation system. The collaboration is simple in logic and ambitious in promise. It seeks to translate credible evidence into coordinated public action.

This report is distinctive for three reasons. First, it uses a nested capacity model to examine legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms, organizational systems, individual skills, and the enabling environment as one interlocking system. Second, it is grounded in dialogue with the institutions that must carry the work, including ministries, regulators, oversight bodies, Parliament, local authorities, and universities, so the recommendations are feasible rather than theoretical. Third, it couples diagnosis with a sequenced roadmap that delivers early wins while building durable architecture.

This work was enriched by thoughtful contributions from public leaders and institutions who shared their time, insight, and candor, including Dr. Tarek Mitri, Deputy Prime Minister; Dr. Fadi Makki, Minister of State for Administrative Reform; Dr. Joe Saddi, Minister of Energy and Water; Dr. Nasser Yassin, former Minister of Environment; Dr. Halima Kaakour, Member of Parliament; Dr. Jean Allayié, President of the Public Procurement Authority; Mr. Georges Maarawi, Director General at the Ministry of Finance and Director General of Land Registration and Cadaster; Judge Mohammad Badran, President of the Court of Audit; Judge Claude Karam, President of the National Anti-Corruption Commission; Judge Georges Atiyeh, President of the Central Inspection Board; Dr. Georges Labaki, President of the École Nationale d'Administration under the Civil Service Board; Mr. Mohamad Mekawi, Governor of Mount Lebanon; and Judge Marwan Abboud, Governor of Beirut.

I invite our partners to read this report closely and to join us in shaping a shared vision and a practical roadmap. If we align around simple standards, clear roles, and transparent reporting, we can improve services, strengthen institutions, and lift living standards for the people of Lebanon.

With appreciation and resolve,

Prof. Pascal Monin

Director, Observatory on Public Service and Good Governance (OFP)
Saint Joseph University of Beirut (USJ)
Beirut, October 2025

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List of Acronyms

Acronym	Full Name
CIB	Central Inspection Bureau
CoA	Court of Accounts
CoM	Council of Ministers
CSB	Civil Service Board
DLRC	Directorate of Land Registration and Cadaster
DPM	Deputy Prime Minister
ENA	École Nationale d'Administration (the National School of Administration)
ERA	Energy Regulatory Authority
EvalMap25	Lebanon National Evaluation Policy Roadmap Initiative 2025
LebEval	Lebanese Evaluation Association (National VOPE)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoE	Ministry of Environment
MEW	Ministry of Energy and Water
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
NACC	National Anti-Corruption Commission
NEC	National Evaluation Capacity
NECD	National Evaluation Capacity Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NNCS	Nested NECD Capacity System
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
OPF	Observatory on Public Service and Good Governance at Saint Joseph University
OMSAR	Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform
PPA	Public Procurement Authority
RBM	Results-Based Management
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SRM	Socially Responsible Management (<i>Managing partner of OPF</i>)
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USJ	Université Saint-Joseph
USJ-OPF	Université Saint-Joseph – Observatory on Public Service and Good Governance
VOPE	Voluntary Organization for Professional Evaluation

I. Executive Summary

Lebanon's National Evaluation System² is not simply underdeveloped; it is structurally absent.

In a governance context marked by fragmented mandates, disjointed reform cycles, and institutional mistrust, evaluation remains neither legally codified nor functionally institutionalized nor integrated into core administrative practice. Ministries operate without evaluation mandates. Civil servants lack pathways to develop or apply evaluative skills. Coordination across oversight bodies remains informal, episodic, and donor driven. What exists is a patchwork of project-bound monitoring and evaluation efforts, disconnected from national systems and unsupported by policy frameworks or organizational routines.

This report, co-led by the Observatory on Public Service and Good Governance at Saint Joseph University of Beirut and Socially Responsible Management, provides a system wide diagnostic of Lebanon's evaluation landscape. It is anchored in the Nested National Evaluation Capacity Development System model³ and informed by high level institutional consultations, including the office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Ministries of Finance and of Energy and Water, the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, the Public Procurement Authority, the National School of Administration, the Central Inspection Board, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, the Court of Audit and governors. The report maps the current state of the evaluation ecosystem across five interdependent pillars: Legal and Policy Frameworks, Institutional Mechanisms, Organizational Capacities, Individual Capacities, and the Enabling Environment.

A. Key findings



Legal and policy frameworks are Lebanon's weakest link. Despite promising precedents such as Article 111 in the procurement law, Law 244 of 2021, which institutionalized a prerequisite internet audit framework, there is no cross-cutting law, decree, or strategic directive that mandates national evaluation. Legislative work remains driven by compliance, and evaluation clauses are often absent from reform-heavy laws. This legal vacuum makes evaluation not obligatory, open to reversal, and dependent on political goodwill.

- Institutional mechanisms reveal fragmented readiness. Several public bodies, including the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW), the Public Procurement Authority (PPA), the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), the Central Inspection Bureau (CIB), and the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA), show reform appetite and early procedural footholds. The absence of a unified National Evaluation function governance structure or an evaluation-centered interministerial coordination mechanism limits diffusion, standardization, and sustainability. Institutional behavior remains siloed, and reform activation depends more on individual leadership than on system incentives.
- Organizational capacities show some innovation without institutionalization. Public administrations such as MoF, OMSAR, CIB, COA, and PPA manage digital tools, but they lack internal evaluation units, quality assurance protocols, and feedback loops. Evaluation remains externally imposed rather than structurally internalized.
- Individual capacities show latent potential but structural neglect. Civil servants, including participants in ENA training programs, show growing demand for reform relevant competencies such as results-based management, public administration management, and language proficiency. Evaluation is absent from job descriptions, promotion criteria, and career pathways. Ministries, already understaffed, lack dedicated focal points, and civil service human resources frameworks do not recognize evaluation as a profession.

² A national evaluation system is the set of rules, institutions, skills, data, and routines that allow the state to plan, measure, and learn.

³ National Evaluation Capacity Development model is a whole of government approach that strengthens skills, institutions, rules, data, and routines so the state produces credible evidence and uses it in planning, budgeting, delivery, and accountability across linked legal, institutional, organizational, individual, and enabling environment pillars.

- The enabling environment offers the strongest momentum. Political signals from reform-oriented ministers, international community insistence on results-based governance, and rising citizen demand for transparency have created a rare convergence of incentives. Without legal codification, public reporting and communication infrastructure, and cross sectoral anchoring, this momentum may stall.

B. Strategic implications



Lebanon does not need to invent a new ecosystem; it must activate and align the one already in motion. This requires a holistic view of the evaluation system and an inclusive roadmap with clear steps, milestones, and role assignments for every stakeholder, making National Evaluation Capacity Development a collective national undertaking that leaves no actor behind. Based on the evidence and consultations, the strategic actions below are sequenced to deliver early wins while building durable architecture and to shift the evaluation discourse from intent to practice.

- **Legal anchoring and accountability:** Enact an M&E law that embeds evaluation across the public administration and the full project cycle; strengthen oversight bodies such as CoA with enforceable access, response timelines, and sanction powers; issue implementing rules on roles, responsibilities, accountability mechanisms, cooperation, data access, timelines, and publication; and link budget execution, from early project activities till the Final Account, to phased results based indicators with mandatory public reporting.
- **Whole-of-government planning and evaluation compact:** Establish under the Prime Minister's Office a planning and evaluation committee that aligns the government's planning cycle to a single results framework; connects inter-ministerial (horizontal) and intra-ministerial (vertical) coordination with defined roles, timelines, and escalation; standardizes and contextualizes international evaluation practice; adopts a baseline indicator and metadata catalogue with a designated steward; mandates time-bound publication and drive transparency through public dashboards and periodic performance notes.
- **Parliamentary oversight and civic transparency:** Promote the constitutional role of Parliament in scrutinizing plans, spending, and results; equip standing committees with basic analytics to read indicators and follow up; and use access-to-information to enable civil society, academia, and observatories to conduct complementary social audit that draws on government dashboards and provides evidence-based inputs to legislative follow-up.
- **Human capital and professionalization:** Invest in the people who will make the system work. On the public-service side, empower training-mandated institutions such as ENA to run targeted modules for focal points on Result-Based Management, indicators, data quality, managerial use of dashboards, and citizen-facing reporting, and mandate CSB to classify evaluation functions within job families and performance metrics on a fixed timetable; on the supply side, support universities to develop evaluation curricula, strengthen VOPEs, and grow a community of practice that equips new and current evaluators with applied skills.
- If these steps are taken, evaluation will drive adaptive governance, service improvement, and public accountability.

II. Introduction and Analytical Framework

A. Background and Rationale



Lebanon's governance crisis is not merely institutional. It is existential. Years of compounded collapse have eroded the administrative backbone of the state, fractured coordination across ministries, and severed trust between citizens and public institutions. The result is a public sector architecture where policies are decoupled from delivery, reform agendas proliferate without traction, and the absence of evaluative mechanisms entrenches opacity, inertia, and politicized resource allocation. Against this backdrop, NECD is not an optional tool. It is a strategic governance function. It provides the connective tissue that links national plans to lived realities, restores policy credibility, and embeds learning and accountability into the operating logic of the state.

Lebanon faces a near total absence of institutionalized evaluation systems. Evaluation is neither systematically legislated nor operationalized. It is misunderstood, under resourced, and functionally absent from most ministerial workflows. Ministries operate in silos, planning and implementation cycles are disjointed, and no single entity is mandated to coordinate or standardize evaluation practice. The National Evaluation Capacity Development conference in 2024, together with consultations conducted by the Observatory on Public Service and Good Governance at Saint Joseph University, and Socially Responsible Management during 2025, confirmed that even when evaluations occur, they are often donor driven, project bound, and disconnected from national systems. This is a missed opportunity at a time when Lebanon needs to rebuild public confidence, improve resource use, and show institutional learning.

In this context, a robust National Evaluation System offers more than performance measurement. It offers state repair. It enables governments to shift from political improvisation to evidence-based governance; from fragmented donor compliance to systemwide accountability. For Lebanon, a functioning system could serve as the operational infrastructure for real time monitoring of recovery plans, institutional reform, and localization of the Sustainable Development Goals. It would allow ministries to pilot evidence loops, adjust failed interventions, and defend policies with data rather than rhetoric. It can also serve as a bridge that links civil society demands for accountability with governmental claims to legitimacy, particularly among youth who report disillusionment with public systems, as shown by the SRM youth trust index⁴ in which only 16 percent of youth express confidence in public services.

The impetus for this mapping is both technical and strategic. It responds to three converging needs. First, to provide a diagnostic baseline of the evaluation ecosystem to inform future reform sequencing. Second, to identify institutional entry points and reform champions across ministries, oversight bodies, and training institutions. Third, to serve as a strategic coordination tool for national and international actors who aim to support National Evaluation Capacity Development in ways that align with domestic reform priorities and with international accountability standards, including Lebanon's commitments under the Sustainable Development Goals.

Informed by high level stakeholder consultations and grounded in real time socio-political and institutional insight, this mapping is not an abstract typology. It is a strategic platform intended to help Lebanon move from fragmented, ad hoc evaluation practices to a coherent, embedded, and forward-looking national evaluation system. It aims to restore credibility, rebuild institutional memory, and reposition evaluation as a central pillar of governance in Lebanon's next chapter.

⁴ The Youth Trust Index is a survey led by Socially Responsible Management. It was fielded during gLOCAL Evaluation Week in June 2024 at the Saint Joseph University of Beirut. It measures perceived trust in government across eight dimensions: transparency and truthfulness of information, responsiveness, opportunities for participation, effectiveness of public services, fairness and non-discrimination, clarity and frequency of communication, safety and security, and integrity and honesty. The index reports results from 452 young Lebanese respondents.


B. Analytical Framework



The conceptual framework for this ecosystem mapping is the Nested NECD Capacity System, NNCS. It is a systems thinking model that operationalizes five interdependent capacity dimensions set out in the National Evaluation Capacity Development framework. These are Legal and Policy Frameworks, Institutional Mechanisms, Organizational Capacities, Individual Capacities, and the Enabling Environment. The components are interlocking layers within Lebanon's evaluation architecture. Read together, they show how evaluation capacity is shaped by the interplay of legal mandates, institutional incentives, technical competencies, internal systems, and broader social and political dynamics. The framing reflects the baseline diagnosis consolidated during the inception phase and draws on updated insight from high level stakeholder interviews that provide real time institutional signals and reform positioning.



The **Legal and Policy Frameworks** pillar covers the formal instruments that legitimize evaluation in the public sector, including laws, decrees, regulatory frameworks, and strategic directives. It assesses whether evaluation is mandated, whether legal provisions assign clear institutional responsibilities, and whether reform laws embed evaluation requirements in their implementation logic.



The **Institutional Mechanisms** pillar focuses on the public bodies that govern, coordinate, and oversee evaluation across sectors. These include central ministries, regulatory authorities, advisory councils, and inter ministerial committees. The emphasis is on mandates, convening power, and procedural alignment.



The **Organizational Capacities** pillar captures the internal systems, processes, and resources that enable institutions to plan, commission, conduct, and use evaluations. This includes evaluation units, performance dashboards, human resources policies, budget links, feedback loops, and data interoperability.



The **Individual Capacities** pillar refers to the technical competencies, functional roles, and professional incentives available to civil servants, consultants, academics, and youth actors who engage in evaluation. It considers training availability, evaluator pipelines, recognition in civil service frameworks, and access to continuous learning.



The **Enabling Environment** pillar reflects broader contextual factors, including political will, citizen demand, donor alignment, data access, a culture of transparency, and digital infrastructure. Together these factors shape whether evaluation is accepted, valued, and acted upon across Lebanon's governance landscape.

Applied in a holistic way, the framework moves beyond a descriptive listing of actors toward a diagnostic mapping of systemic strengths, structural bottlenecks, and high leverage reform nodes. Each component serves as an analytical lens and as a decision support scaffold for future policy priorities. The framework helps identify institutions that can anchor reform, policies that are ready for revision, and human capital networks that are ready to scale. In this way, it turns baseline insights and stakeholder intelligence into a coherent architecture for evaluating and strengthening Lebanon's national evaluation capacity.

C. Scope and Methodology



1. SCOPE

This ecosystem analysis report provides a system-level diagnosis of Lebanon's National Evaluation Function landscape with full national scope and institutional reach. It focuses on public sector evaluation infrastructure at central and sectoral levels, covering executive entities, oversight bodies, reform institutions, and state linked training platforms. The national scope is primary. The report selectively applies sector lenses in public finance, energy, environment, procurement, and civil service reform where evaluation has a legal basis or a clear pilot opportunity. Non-governmental actors, including academia, Voluntary Organizations for Professional Evaluation, and civil society, are included where they contribute to institutional capacity, evaluator training, or reform momentum.

2. UNITS OF ANALYSIS

The mapping examines five units of analysis that together describe the national evaluation ecosystem.

- Legal and policy instruments that establish mandates and roles.
- Institutions that govern, coordinate, or oversee evaluation.
- Organizational systems and tools inside public bodies that enable the use of evaluation.
- Individual roles and competencies that sustain practice.
- Enabling Environment affecting evaluation practices.

3. DATA SOURCES

The analysis draws on three evidence streams.

- Proceedings and materials from the National Evaluation Capacity Development conference in 2024.
- A document review, including laws, decrees, policies, organizational charts, and public guidance.
- Targeted consultations with public bodies and ecosystem actors during the inception and update phases.⁵

4. SAMPLING AND SELECTION

Consultations followed a purposive sampling strategy that sought variation by function, authority level, and reform relevance. Selection criteria included current or potential mandate for evaluation, role in coordination or oversight, presence of digital or audit systems, and evidence of a reform window. The sample included the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, the Ministry of Finance, the Public Procurement Authority, the National School of Administration, the Ministry of Energy and Water, the Court of Audit, the Central Inspection Board, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and other bodies. Interviews were non-attributed and followed a structured guide.

⁵ Consultations included meetings and exchanges with high level stakeholders between April and October 2025, including but not limited to: Dr. Tarek Mitri, Deputy Prime Minister; Dr. Fadi Makki, Minister of State for Administrative Reform; Dr. Joe Saddi, Minister of Energy and Water; Dr. Nasser Yassin, former Minister of Environment; Dr. Halima Kaakour, Member of Parliament; Dr. Jean Allayié, President of the Public Procurement Authority; Mr. Georges Maarawi, Director General at the Ministry of Finance and Director General of Land Registration and Cadaster; Judge Mohammad Badran, President of the Court of Audit; Judge Claude Karam, President of the National Anti-Corruption Commission; Judge Georges Atiyeh, President of the Central Inspection Board; Dr. Georges Labaki, President of the École Nationale d'Administration under the Civil Service Board; Mr. Mohamad Mekawi, Governor of Mount Lebanon; and Judge Marwan Abboud, Governor of Beirut.

5. ANALYTICAL APPROACH

All consultation notes and documents were coded to the five-pillar framework defined in Section II.B and then analyzed with the Nested NECD Capacity System model. This two-step approach moved from raw inputs to a structured ecosystem diagnosis. In parallel, a validated NECD assessment toolkit and a stakeholder influence matrix were applied to rate each pillar on current status, recent developments, identified needs, persistent challenges, actionable opportunities, and institution led recommendations. Ratings were discussed in internal moderation sessions, and disagreements were resolved by consensus. Outputs were consolidated in a comparative coding matrix across institutions and pillars.

6. QUALITY ASSURANCE AND LIMITATIONS

Quality assurance included standardized interview guides, double review of notes, version control of the coding matrix, and cross checks between documentary sources and consultation claims. The analysis is limited by uneven document availability, time constraints on some interviews, and the evolving nature of reform processes. These limits were mitigated through triangulation of sources, conservative scoring where evidence was partial, and follow-up queries to clarify factual points. The ratings should be read as directional signals rather than definitive grades. It is worth noting that the illustrative examples in this report reflect the author's observations of the public administration landscape based solely on the applied data collection tools. They are indicative rather than exhaustive and may not capture the full picture.

7. ETHICS AND DATA HANDLING

Consultations were conducted on a voluntary and non-attributed basis. Notes were stored on secure institutional drives at the Observatory and Socially Responsible Management with restricted access. Personal data were minimized and handled in line with good practice for research ethics.

8. LINK TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The methodology produced an evidence-based mapping of the main components of the national evaluation ecosystem. The comparative results inform the findings in Section III and the time prioritized recommendations in Section IV.

III. Mapping Key Components of Lebanon's National Evaluation Ecosystem

This section provides a high-level assessment of each of the five components of the evaluation ecosystem defined in Section II.B. For every component it summarizes current status, identifies key gaps and weaknesses, and highlights strategic opportunities for improvement.

A. Legal and Policy Frameworks



A robust legal and policy framework is the bedrock of any sustainable National Evaluation System. In Lebanon, the infrastructure that should support monitoring and evaluation remains fragmented, under leveraged, and contingent on political will. Consultations and the legal scan confirm that the absence of a coherent, codified mandate is not only a legal omission. It is a structural impediment to learning, accountability, and reform delivery. This section examines five sub dimensions of the legal and policy pillar: mandate architecture, legislative pathways, regulatory integration, sectoral entry points, and constitutional governance.

1. MANDATE ARCHITECTURE: ABSENCE OF A UNIFIED LEGAL OBLIGATION TO EVALUATE

The public administration lacks a binding national framework that mandates the use, production, and application of evaluations across the state. No horizontal instrument, such as an evaluation law, decree, or unified policy framework, establishes evaluation as a government wide function. Even the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, the historical node for administrative reform, operates without a legal basis for systemic evaluation, which has kept practice at the level of projects rather than institutional norms. The 2007 attempt to institutionalize a public performance monitoring mechanism remains the closest precedent. It signals institutional memory, not legal continuity.

2. LEGISLATIVE PATHWAYS: FRAGMENTED REFORM MOMENTUM WITHOUT EVALUATION CODIFICATION

Several reform-oriented laws are under implementation or negotiation, such as Law 244 of 2021 on public procurement, Law 462 of 2002 on the electricity sector, and Law 318 of 2023 on distributed renewable energy. None contain explicit clauses that mandate monitoring and evaluation as part of oversight, learning, or feedback loops. Legislative drafting remains compliance-oriented, and legal texts often omit references to evaluation frameworks, performance standards, or accountability benchmarks. Engagements with the Ministry of Energy and Water, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Anti-corruption Commission show legislative activity but also a clear implementation risk. Unless evaluation is codified in secondary decrees or implementation frameworks, the reform window will close without embedding systems for accountability, learning and improvement.

Parliamentary work led by MP Halima Kaakour provides a complementary pathway. The draft law seeks to embed monitoring and evaluation across state institutions and includes safeguards on independence, quality assurance, transparency, cooperation duties, access to information, response times, and publication rules. The approach avoids creating a new authority, strengthens the Court of Audit through targeted amendments, and links the Final Account and budget execution to indicators and evaluation requirements.

3. REGULATORY INTEGRATION: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING M&E IN LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

Public procurement offers a credible starting point: Article 111 of Law 244 of 2021 requires internal audits for procurement entities and can inform how evaluative obligations are designed. Internal audit and evaluation are not interchangeable; audit tests control and compliance, while evaluation supports learning and evidence-based decision making. Legal definitions should therefore expand to recognize independent, learning-oriented, and participatory evaluation so that procedural auditing is not treated as evaluation.

Experience with the National Anti-Corruption Commission illustrates the cost of legislating without an operational envelope. Law 175 of 2020 created the Commission, yet executive decrees, data access provisions, and cooperation protocols were not in place, and the absence of enforceable file sharing, response time standards, and escalation rules has limited investigations and coordination. Future reforms should carry a minimum implementation package that includes these instruments from the start.

For service level performance reporting, Central Inspection and its IMPACT platform require clear legal provisions on data access, privacy, and disclosure, and a government-wide circular or decree should set indicator standards, publication frequency, and agency responsibilities for service dashboards.

4. SECTORAL LEGAL ENTRY POINTS: TIMELY BUT UNCODIFIED OPPORTUNITIES

The initiative titled “Reinventing the Public Administration 2030”, led by the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform and endorsed by the Presidency and the Cabinet, provides a timely vehicle to embed evaluation clauses in sector reforms. Phase two, the Reform Blueprint, will define roles, standards, and rules of practice that can include the National Evaluation System. At subnational level, governorates might offer legal entry points. Governors implement laws and central directives and oversee regional offices. In Beirut, the Governor serves as the municipality’s executive authority. These anchors could allow evaluation obligations to be written into municipal management and service rules.

Within this national and subnational umbrella, sector-specific reform windows, particularly in infrastructure, environment, and digital governance, can mainstream evaluation through legal channels. Legislative initiatives at the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy and Water, including digital land valuation and electricity sector liberalization, should operationalize the Reform Blueprint by embedding the same evaluation standards in primary and secondary legislation and, where relevant, in municipal instructions. In each case, performance indicators, evaluation protocols, and reporting requirements should be placed in the text of laws and their decrees so that national design, sector rules, and local practice align.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE REALITIES: THE LEGAL-POLITICAL DIVIDE

Any legal foundation for evaluation must account for Lebanon’s governance duality, since the separation of authority between ministers and directors general complicates ownership, enforcement, and reform continuity. Engagements with senior public administration experts indicate that mandates should be co-owned across the administrative hierarchy, grounded in both ministerial discretion and the continuity of directors general. This shared mandate must also guide how oversight functions interact when responsibilities overlap.

Clarity on reporting lines and lead responsibility is therefore required where oversight bodies intersect. The legal framework should designate the lead agency and the escalation path in matters that involve the National Anti-Corruption Commission, Central Inspection, the Public Procurement Authority, and the public prosecutor, and planned reporting to Parliament under the national program can reinforce political oversight and administrative continuity.

CONCLUSION

Lebanon's evaluation deficit is fundamentally legal and institutional, not technical: there is no unified mandate that requires ministries, public utilities, or decentralized administrations to plan, conduct, publish, and respond to evaluations, which leaves practice fragmented and vulnerable to political cycles. A credible remedy is a minimum viable legal package that moves from principle to routine: a framework law on evaluation, vetted for constitutional fit, that defines scope, roles, access to administrative data, response timelines, publication in machine readable open format, and sanction triggers; implementing decrees and cross government circulars that adopt national indicator and metadata standards and set fixed disclosure cadences with a recorded management response; and standard operating procedures that translate these rules into daily workflow. Legislative pathways can deliver rapid traction if Parliament and the executive act in parallel by inserting model evaluation clauses into active reforms in public procurement, energy, and fiscal policy, while secondary instruments close the design without operations gap through enforceable data sharing, cooperation duties, and predefined escalation steps. Constitutional realities require shared ownership across political and administrative hierarchies, with cosigned mandates that bind ministers and directors general, named lead and cooperation roles for interfaces among the National Anti-Corruption Commission, Central Inspection, the Public Procurement Authority, the Court of Audit, sector regulators, and the public prosecutor, and planned reporting to Parliament that strengthens oversight without creating new bodies. Subnational administration provides the operational bridge, as governorates and municipalities can host service dashboards and publish to the same national standards and calendar, ensuring evidence flows from service units to policy tables. If adopted as a single sequenced package of law, decree, circular, protocol, and procedure, this architecture will convert evaluation from episodic projects into an enforceable rule of government that enables learning, strengthens accountability, improves service performance, and accelerates reform delivery.

B. Institutional Mechanisms



A credible and durable national evaluation system requires robust and context sensitive institutional architectures. In Lebanon, mechanisms for National Evaluation Capacity Development are unevenly distributed, often embedded in sector reform silos, and shaped by varying degrees of political sponsorship, procedural readiness, and capacity for diffusion. Based on targeted consultations and institutional reviews, this section presents five interdependent dimensions: political sponsorship and institutional custodianship; National Evaluation Function governance and coordination interfaces; evaluation enabling systems and institutional processes; authority activation and institutional willingness; and institutional learning and workforce diffusion.

1. POLITICAL SPONSORSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL CUSTODIANSHIP

Lebanon's National Evaluation System trajectory is shaped by who sponsors reform and by who holds technical levers. For instance, at the Ministry of Energy and Water, leadership has supported the potential integrating evaluation into sector legislation under Laws 462 and 318. At the structural level, the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform remains a custodian of reform stewardship and convenes actors across government. The Civil Service Board provides diagnostic capacity through workforce surveys and establishment reviews and exercises normative oversight through job classification, recruitment, and pay setting⁶. The National School of Administration (ENA) links these norms to practice by aligning training with the skills required for evaluation in public service. Central Inspection, through its oversight mandate, and the Governors of Mount Lebanon and Beirut, through their statutory coordinating roles, can act as custodians for subnational pilots. Together these nodes form a dispersed but identifiable cluster whose engagement is essential for operationalizing national evaluation at political and administrative levels.

6 CSB presented results from the national workforce survey to the Inter Ministerial Committee on Public Sector Reform, including an estimated vacancy rate of about 73 percent in the establishment, the presence of roughly 13,000 non-regular hires, and priorities for job classification and job descriptions. CSB is leading proposals on the ranks and salaries series and links remuneration to job requirements, competencies, and risk. The approach includes eliminating obsolete roles, creating new roles aligned with digital transformation and sector needs, and embedding evaluation functions and competencies in job descriptions and grading.

2. NATIONAL EVALUATION FUNCTION GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION INTERFACES

The absence of a formal national evaluation steering architecture does not mean coordination is absent. Coordination is emergent, informal, and often bound by sector work. The Inter Ministerial Reform Committee, noted during consultations with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, remains an executive level interface with cross sector reach. At sector level, the Public Procurement Authority carries a mandate that spans all public procurement actors, including municipalities, which suggests potential for vertical diffusion of standards through procurement systems. Advisory roundtables convened by OMSAR may provide a consultative forum that can be formalized.

A center of government interface can now be established. A ministerial committee for planning and evaluation under the Prime Minister's Office would steer and coordinate evaluation across sectors and receive diagnostics and progress updates. Division of labor should be clarified among relevant oversight bodies, Parliament, and line ministries for planning, disclosure, review, and follow up. The three-phase architecture-led project (Reinventing the Public Administration 2030) led by OMSAR and supported by a steering group that includes OFP SRM and brings public, academic, and policy partners into a neutral forum, could provide a practical convening spine for this interface.

3. EVALUATION-ENABLING SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

Several institutions already operate processes that enable evaluation even when not labeled as such. The Public Procurement Authority has formalized internal audit practices in line with Law 244 of 2021 and can inform evaluation integrated oversight across ministries. The General Directorate of the Ministry of Finance has several digital systems, including real estate valuation and the national cadaster registry, which provide procedural backbones for data informed decision making and legal accountability. At the Ministry of Energy and Water, procurement and licensing functions are embedded and can host performance monitoring layers, particularly once the Energy Regulatory Authority is operational. The National School of Administration has initiated curriculum reforms in budgeting, procurement, and access to information, which signals convergence with evaluation practice. The systems exist. The task is to connect them to evaluation use cases and feedback loops. Central Inspection can anchor a pilot that links oversight with routine performance tracking in one or two services using the IMPACT platform. Interfaces with the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and line ministries should be formalized for data requests, validation, and escalation based on dashboard signals. IMPACT can also carry common indicator standards and reporting routines to municipal and service center levels where relevant.

4. AUTHORITY ACTIVATION AND INSTITUTIONAL WILLINGNESS

There is a gap between latent mandates and active implementation. Several institutions hold legal or operational entry points for evaluation, but only a few have acted on them. Signals of willingness include interest in reviving performance monitoring initiatives, commitments to include evaluation clauses in implementation decrees at the Ministry of Energy and Water, and readiness to position the Ministry of Finance as a national pilot. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister has indicated readiness to include evaluation within reform prioritization agendas. By contrast, bodies such as the Civil Service Board, despite formal authority, face structural inertia and need targeted engagement to turn mandate into action. Recent signals strengthen activation. Central Inspection has offered to serve as a pilot institution. The interviewed Governors expressed readiness to designate their administrations as pilot sites and to convene municipalities. These offers should be sequenced into a short pipeline of pilots that demonstrate feasibility and inform scale.

5. INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING AND WORKFORCE DIFFUSION

A sustainable national evaluation model must extend beyond elite policy spaces and rest on institutional learning and incentives in public service. The National School of Administration and the Civil Service Board are central nodes for this work. The National School of Administration is open to integrating modules that support evaluation practice and has a record of outreach across grades and functions. Its collaboration with development partners and civil society supports demand responsive learning. The Civil Service Board is the only platform that can align evaluation with job descriptions, performance metrics, and career pathways across ministries. These vehicles remain underused in the absence of a human capital strategy that treats evaluation as a core professional

competency rather than a reporting tool. Training should follow function. ENA can host short modules for line ministry focal points, Central Inspection teams, and governorate staff on indicator design, data quality, the use of dashboards for managerial decisions, and citizen facing reporting. The Civil Service Board can recognize these functions in job descriptions and performance metrics so that learning converts into roles and career values.

6. CONCLUSION

Lebanon can turn scattered evaluation practice into a durable national system only if institutional mechanisms are activated through clear mandates, simple instruments, and visible routines. Political sponsorship must be anchored at the center of government through a ministerial committee for planning and evaluation under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) with shared custodianship across the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR), the Civil Service Board (CSB), the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA), Central Inspection, and governors, so leadership and continuity are jointly held. Governance should move from ad-hoc coordination to an explicit interface that records who plans, who publishes, who reviews, and who follows up, using law, decree, circular, protocol, and standard operating procedure to fix access rules, response timelines, and escalation paths. Existing systems already provide an operational spine, including the Public Procurement Authority's audit routines, Ministry of Finance digital backbones, Ministry of Energy and Water licensing channels, and Central Inspection's IMPACT platform; the next step is to connect these to standard indicators, management response notes, and a calendar of public release in machine readable open format. Authority must be activated through a short pipeline of proof-of-concept pilots led by willing institutions such as Central Inspection, the Ministry of Finance, and selected governorates, with publication and closure tracked to verify that findings translate into corrective actions. Finally, institutional learning must diffuse beyond expert circles: ENA should be empowered to deliver role specific modules on Result-Based Management, indicator design, data quality, managerial use of dashboards, and citizen facing reporting, while the CSB embeds evaluation competencies in job descriptions, career progression, and performance appraisal so skills convert into practice and value. Taken together, these measures provide a practical, sequenced path from willingness to routine, and position institutional mechanisms to carry a nationally owned evaluation system that is coherent in law, credible in method, and reliable in day-to-day administration.

C. Individual Capacities



A national evaluation system is only as strong as the people who design it, apply it, and learn from it. In Lebanon, consultations show individual capacity marked by siloed expertise, institutional fragility, and conceptual gaps. Motivation is rising, yet technical footholds remain the exception. Evidence from the Central Inspection Board, the Court of Audit, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission adds constraints on mobility, training, and incentives. This section reviews four dimensions: evaluation awareness and motivation; technical proficiency and functional differentiation; institutionalization of learning pathways; and evaluation as a recognized career discipline.

1. EVALUATION AWARENESS AND MOTIVATION: HIGH LATENT DEMAND, LOW SYSTEMIC OWNERSHIP

The clearest signal of demand comes from civil servants. ENA recent juridical stream drew 123 applicants for 20 seats, which shows demand that exceeds system supply. Yet this interest is not embedded. Ministries lack evaluation focal points, and evaluative interest sits in project units rather than across administrative hierarchies. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister notes rising awareness in reform committees but no defined roles. The Central Inspection Board, the Public Procurement Authority, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission add that limited staff mobility weakens the formation of focal teams and sustains ownership of evaluation tasks. The result is a motivation readiness gap. Interest is real, but role recognition, institutional uptake, and civil service mandates are missing. Beyond central ministries, civil servants, universities, and youth networks asked for clear evaluation of public administration performance and results. Ministries and municipalities asked for simple standards, clear roles, and phased steps that can start now and scale later.

2. TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION: UNDERSTAFFED SYSTEMS, UNBUILT SKILLS

Technical proficiency is uneven and constrained by staffing. Many institutions lack the personnel base to sustain routine work, which leaves little space to build evaluation skills. At the Ministry of Energy and Water, consultations indicate a vacancy rate near 85 percent. The Central Inspection Board and the National Anti-Corruption Commission report restricted transfers and unfilled requests, with cases where forty transfers were requested and four approved. The Public Procurement Authority shows central analytical capacity that is not mirrored at subnational level. System-wide, role differentiation is weak, evaluation specific job descriptions are rare, and the scaffolding to scale skills is missing. Evaluation remains aspirational and detached from the realities of an overburdened and under-resourced workforce. Parliament also needs analytical capacity to review plans, spending, and performance evidence.

3. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LEARNING PATHWAYS: TRAINING WITHOUT TRACTION

Despite rising demand, Lebanon lacks a structured pathway to embed evaluation training in the civil service. Current efforts are weakly linked to incentives and often driven by donors. ENA, among other training-mandated public institutions, offers a platform to anchor evaluation function learning, but it does not yet provide certified curricula, digital delivery at scale, or modules tied to career progression. The Central Inspection Board, the Public Procurement Authority, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission flagged immediate training needs for inspection, audit liaison, access to information, and case triage related to integrity and performance. Targeted cohorts can meet this need when course content is tied to role requirements and recognized by the civil service. Training should follow function. Short modules can equip line ministry focal points, Central Inspection teams, and governorate staff in Result-Based Management, indicator design, data quality, the use of dashboards for managerial decisions, and citizen facing reporting.

4. EVALUATION AS A RECOGNIZED CAREER DISCIPLINE: ABSENT FROM THE PUBLIC SERVICE ARCHITECTURE

Evaluation is not yet a defined or promotable function in public administration. It is largely absent from job descriptions, not linked to promotion metrics, and rarely used as a hiring criterion. Reliance on external consultants, especially in environment and infrastructure, limits internalization of skills and institutional memory. Oversight bodies report no performance appraisal systems and no coherent salary scale, which weakens incentives to invest in evaluation skills and reduces retention. Without a career track, incentives, and formal recognition of evaluation competencies, the civil service cannot build or retain the leadership it needs. The Civil Service Board can classify and grade evaluation related functions, including investigation support, legal analysis, records management, and service performance roles, and assign them to existing job families.

5. CONCLUSION

Lebanon's individual evaluation capacity rests on high motivation but low structural traction: the talent exists, but the system to recognize, reward, and retain it does not. The civil service remains understaffed, with vacancy rates exceeding eighty percent in key ministries, limiting the ability to institutionalize new functions. Evaluation specific job descriptions, promotion incentives, and analytical roles across public functions are absent, which leaves evaluation work dependent on short term projects and external consultants. A credible national strategy must therefore move from training without traction to a structured professionalization pathway. The École Nationale d'Administration (ENA) and the Civil Service Board (CSB) together can anchor this transition by developing certified evaluation curricula, linking course completion to career advancement, and embedding competencies in job classification, appraisal, and promotion systems. The Central Inspection Board (CIB), the Public Procurement Authority (PPA), and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) can serve as immediate pilot institutions for applied learning through modules in indicator design, data verification, dashboard use, and citizen facing reporting, with results made public on a fixed release calendar. Short courses should follow function and role specificity, ensuring each trained officer applies knowledge to a live management task. To sustain diffusion, evaluation must be formalized as a recognized discipline within the civil service framework, supported by coherent salary scales, career progression tracks, and internal mobility protocols. If adopted, this model would transform evaluation from a voluntary skill into an institutional profession that attracts capable personnel, strengthens evidence-based decision making, and embeds accountability and learning at every level of the Lebanese administration.

D. Organizational Capacities



Organizational capacity is the spine of a National Evaluation System. It turns mandates into action, data into evidence, and reforms into learning. In Lebanon, tools, platforms, and reforms exist, but they are isolated, weakly institutionalized, and under resourced. Readiness is fragmented in design as well as practice. This section reviews three sub dimensions: evaluation systems and internal architecture; data infrastructure and interoperability; and feedback loops, quality assurance, and organizational learning.

1. EVALUATION SYSTEMS AND INTERNAL ARCHITECTURE: PILOTS WITHOUT STRUCTURE

Most ministries and public bodies lack evaluation units, formal protocols, and internal blueprints to host evaluation as a core function. Where evaluation relevant reforms exist, including internal audit at the Public Procurement Authority, they run without quality assurance systems, institutional safeguards, or codified monitoring and evaluation roles. Some regulatory and oversight bodies produce considerable outputs, yet it does not house a structured evaluation unit that links findings to planning, budgeting, and personnel systems. The issue is not a lack of innovation. It is failure to turn pilots into durable scaffolds. Central Inspection can host an organizational pilot that links oversight to routine performance tracking for one or two services through IMPACT. Interfaces with the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and line ministries should be formalized for data requests, validation, and escalation based on dashboard signals. Within oversight bodies, the National Anti-Corruption Commission should install a basic case management workflow with tasking, deadlines, escalation paths, and an audit trail so that oversight outputs inform planning, budgeting, and personnel decisions rather than remaining standalone files.

2. DATA INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTEROPERABILITY: A DATA-POOR STATE IN A DIGITAL AGE

Lebanon is data poor because systems are fragmented, outdated, and under resourced. Years of crisis eroded digital infrastructure, weakened data integrity, and slowed the build out of interoperable platforms. Most ministries do not run centralized dashboards or real time analytics. OMSAR's digital agenda and the mandate of the Ministry of State for Artificial Intelligence signal intent, yet they remain underfunded and disconnected from national planning cycles. Promising pilots, including the Ministry of Finance real estate valuation platform and the National School of Administration planned digital training portal, show feasibility but need financing, integration, and policy anchoring. Central Inspection notes weak system linkages for inspection and integrity casework, with data flows that are not standardized for analysis and reuse. IMPACT platform, or similar relevant initiatives, can serve as the backbone for service dashboards if minimum conditions are met. Hosting, security, user support, and short analytics sprints should be resourced. Metadata standards, validation routines, and a change log are needed to keep results comparable across time and entities. Standard templates for secure data exchange should be adopted between Central Inspection, the Public Procurement Authority, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and line ministries, with common identifiers and basic metadata for reuse. At subnational level, governorates should use simple data sharing protocols with municipal departments and deconcentrated offices, with agreed validation checks and update cycles. Partner requests for common methods and shared data rules can be consolidated into unified taxonomies and indicator libraries.

3. FEEDBACK LOOPS AND LEARNING ARCHITECTURE: DATA GENERATED, INSIGHT LOST

Many public institutions collect data. Few convert it into adaptive practice. Feedback loops that link findings to decisions and reform are informal or absent. The Ministry of Environment lacks an embedded learning cycle. At the Public Procurement Authority, performance outputs have no structured follow-through, which produces reviews that inform but do not improve. OMSAR runs digital pilots with no internal quality assurance protocols. The Ministry of Finance and the Directorate of Land Registration and Cadaster report gaps between performance metrics and fiscal decisions. Oversight bodies note that inspection and integrity outputs are not tracked to resolution or fed back into process redesign. Even institutions dedicated to learning, including the National

School of Administration, do not archive knowledge for reuse and scale and rely on static repositories. The result is evidence collected but rarely acted on. Reinventing the Public Administration 2030 introduces a practical learning cycle. Phase three sets indicators and checks and commits to reporting to citizens and to Parliament. This can serve as the routine loop that links findings to managerial action and to oversight follow up. A two-tier practice should be set. At the executive tier, ministries disclose key performance indicators, plans, and progress on a public dashboard. At the external tier, the Court of Audit conducts independent pre spending evaluation to strengthen credibility. For local services, governorates should define how dashboard signals trigger operational corrections, budget adjustments, and contractor oversight.

4. CONCLUSION

Organizational capacity will become the spine of Lebanon's National Evaluation System once pilots are translated into codified, resourced, and interoperable routines: ministries and agencies should install basic evaluation blueprints and role descriptions; the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) should issue common standard operating procedures for indicator design, data validation, publication, and management response; the Central Inspection Board (CIB) should operate a time-boxed demonstration that links service dashboards on the IMPACT platform to executive decisions and oversight follow-through; the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) should align procurement performance analytics with evaluation feedback; the Ministry of Finance (MoF) should connect fiscal systems to results dashboards; and the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA) should support rapid learning cycles for focal teams. A shared interoperability pack including taxonomies, metadata, and secure exchange templates, as well as a fixed release calendar, named leads, and clear escalation paths is supposed to convert data into managerial action and public accountability. If adopted, this minimum viable system turns scattered innovations into a coherent backbone where evidence reliably drives planning, budgeting, human resources, and corrective action across the administration.

E. Enabling Environment



Lebanon's enabling environment for evaluation shows a fragile yet actionable convergence of political signals, citizen expectations, donor priorities, and institutional ambition. Systemic cohesion is still limited, but incentives are unusually aligned. This section reviews four dimensions: political will and institutional incentives; legal and policy frameworks; public demand, donor leverage, and visibility infrastructure; and non-state actors as enablers of National Evaluation System.

1. POLITICAL WILL AND INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES: FRAGMENTED COMMITMENT, EMERGING SIGNALS

Political will for evaluation is uneven and often tied to individual champions rather than mandates. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy and Water now frame evaluation as a tool for accountability, trust building, and reform credibility. The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform is repositioning as a reform enabler by embedding evaluation in its digital portfolio. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister links reform outcomes to institutionalization. The National School of Administration has committed to performance culture in the training system. These signals are fragile, yet they show growing recognition of evaluation as a political and institutional asset. Reinventing the Public Administration 2030 initiative by OMSAR places evaluation at the center of performance monitoring. Parliamentary stakeholders support institutionalizing evaluation and agree that legislation should advance by broad consensus and with an operational blueprint that is feasible on day one.

2. LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS: VULNERABLE STRUCTURES, UNTAPPED ENTRY POINTS

Rhetorical support has not yet produced structural anchors that protect and institutionalize evaluation. Internal audit precedents in public procurement remain vulnerable without legal guarantees. Performance language at the center of government is not backed by statutes that ensure continuity across leadership cycles. Digital

bottlenecks, including outdated hosting for official portals, weaken visibility and transparency. Without legal embedding and government wide coordination, evaluation efforts risk politicization, reversal, or obsolescence. A consensus-first approach reduces reversal risk. Legal provisions should be paired from the start with decree ready operating rules on roles, response times, cooperation duties, data access, and publication.

3. PUBLIC DEMAND, DONOR LEVERAGE, AND VISIBILITY INFRASTRUCTURE: MOBILIZABLE BUT UNSTRUCTURED

Public demand for transparency in procurement, energy, and land valuation can legitimize evaluation as a governance priority. The Ministry of Energy and Water and the Ministry of Finance reflect this demand in messaging on results and accountability. Donors have moved from passive funding to partnership and link support to measurable institutional outcomes, including with the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Public Procurement Authority. The visibility infrastructure to sustain this momentum is weak. Communication strategies are old-fashioned, portals are underdeveloped, and evaluation is invisible to citizens. A modern visibility stack and a clear content strategy, anchored by a National School of Administration evaluation hub, can convert these gaps into lasting scaffolding for engagement and buy-in. Central Inspection can add citizen visibility through public service dashboards on IMPACT, with partners supporting secure hosting, analytics, and training while government sets standards and disclosure rules. At subnational level, governorates can publish simple dashboards for local services. Pilots in Mount Lebanon and Beirut can offer a replicable model for other governorates and municipalities and strengthen national feasibility.

4. NON-STATE ACTORS AS ENABLERS OF NATIONAL EVALUATION SYSTEM: EXPERTISE, ADVOCACY, AND CONNECTIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

Non state actors are intellectual drivers, technical enablers, and advocacy multipliers for evaluation. Academic institutions, evaluation networks, policy think tanks, media platforms, civil society actors, and private research firms form an engaged support system for public sector reform. The Observatory on Public Service and Good Governance at Saint Joseph University, Socially Responsible Management, LebEval, EvalMENA, and other voluntary organizations for professional evaluation provide normative frameworks, capacity channels, and methodological rigor. Independent evaluators and research institutions fill technical gaps in under resourced ministries, while watchdog organizations and media partners sustain public discourse and feedback loops. Development partners often work through these actors, which makes them bridges between donor priorities and administrative realities. Private firms contribute high frequency and disaggregated data that support evidence-based policy and trust calibration. These actors are part of the connective infrastructure through which evaluation enters the reform narrative. Their role should be institutionalized as co-creators who help shape, validate, and scale the national evaluation system from outside in and bottom up. They can also help co-design the Pact between public administration and citizens under the national program, codifying shared principles, practical standards, and first steps for routine evaluation.

5. CONCLUSION

The enabling environment will support a credible National Evaluation System once emerging signals are fixed into a minimum viable package: the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) should table a consensus legal insert that couples any primary text with decree-ready operating rules; Line Ministries should tie disclosure to budget; the Central Inspection Board (CIB) should extend public service dashboards on the IMPACT platform with named leads and response timelines; the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA) should host a well-communicated evaluation hub and content pipeline; and a structured interface should formalize the roles of universities, evaluator networks, think tanks, media, and watchdogs in translating results and validating use. A shared visibility stack, machine-readable publication and logged management responses are expected to convert aligned incentives into durable practice, protecting evaluation from political cycles and making evidence a routine, publicly verifiable driver of decisions across the administration.

IV. Conclusion

Strengthening Lebanon's national evaluation ecosystem is not an aspirational goal. It is a political, institutional, and developmental necessity. In a context marked by fragmented mandates, crisis induced fatigue, and reform volatility, the mapping confirms a simple truth. Evaluation must move from a peripheral, donor driven activity to a nationally owned, legally grounded, and operational instrument of governance.

The findings do not point to a vacuum. They reveal usable scaffolds that are not yet connected. Legal precedents exist. Ministerial champions are active. Digital and audit tools operate in pockets. Civil servants show demand for skills. Citizens ask for visible results. Yet these elements are not tied together by legal codification, center of government coordination, organizational routines, or career incentives. Activity is present but episodic. Reforms begin but are not internalized. The ecosystem has energy. It lacks architecture.

This ecosystem analysis constitutes a principal deliverable of the EvalMap25 Initiative, through which the OFP has served as a neutral convener—providing analytical clarity and facilitating the co-design of a national roadmap that bridges law with practice and practice with results. Strengthening national evaluation capacity is not the responsibility of a select few; it is a collective endeavour shared among political leaders, administrative institutions, oversight bodies, academic and training entities, evaluators, development partners, and citizens alike.

What is needed now is a political compact that turns alignment into action. Evaluation is not a foreign imposition. It is a sovereign tool to restore institutional memory, rebuild trust, and steer reform with evidence. The compact should translate into immediate and observable commitments.

